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I. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps no one on the current Supreme Court has been more adamant about 
protecting firearm possession rights than Justice Thomas. Take, for example, his 
dissent in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, which on its face was a case about 
the constitutionality of a Texas law that created multiple restrictions on a woman’s 
ability to procure an abortion in the state.1 The Supreme Court invalidated both 
restrictions at issue.2 Justice Thomas’s dissent, however, saw a much deeper prob-
lem in the Court’s constitutional rights jurisprudence, one that went beyond abor-
tion rights. His position with respect to the constitutional right to an abortion al-
ready well-established, Thomas lamented that “[t]he Court has simultaneously 
transformed judicially created rights like the right to an abortion into preferred con-
stitutional rights, while disfavoring many of the rights actually enumerated in the 
Constitution.”3 “But,” he continued, “our Constitution renounces the notion that 
some constitutional rights are more equal than others.”4 
                                                                
 * Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit 
Mercy.  I am grateful to Karen Henning for her comments.  I am also grateful to Patrina Bergamo for her 
excellent research assistance, and to Erin Rodenhouse for her helpful research and thoughtful comments 
throughout the drafting of this article. 
 1. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 2329 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 4. Id. 
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To which enumerated rights could Justice Thomas have been referring? Which 
enumerated rights have been disfavored? He appeared to give a more specific an-
swer in a different case, on the very same day. In Voisine v. United States, the Su-
preme Court held that a reckless domestic assault is a “misdemeanor crime of do-
mestic violence” for purposes of the gun possession restrictions contained in 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).5 Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion expressing concern 
that the Court’s interpretation would sweep the statute into “patently unconstitu-
tional territory” pursuant to the Second Amendment.6 Troubled by the Court’s fail-
ure to appreciate the significance of Second Amendment rights, Thomas wrote, 
“[w]e treat no other constitutional right so cavalierly.”7 Noting that the Government 
could not identify any other constitutional right that could be forever lost by a single 
criminal conviction, and asserting that the Court would never uphold a lifetime ban 
on publishing by a person who had a previous conviction for misdemeanor libel, 
Thomas concluded that “the Court continues to ‘relegat[e] the Second Amendment 
to a second-class right.’”8 
Some of Justice Thomas’s colleagues in the federal judiciary may be (slowly) 
coming around to his view. In 2008, the Supreme Court held in District of Columbia 
v. Heller that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear 
arms in the home for purposes of confrontational defense.9 Although lower federal 
courts have fairly consistently rejected various Second Amendment challenges to 
federal and state gun restrictions,10 a few recent cases suggest that Second Amend-
ment claims, and gun rights more generally, may be gaining traction.11 Much of the 
lower court Second Amendment litigation often turns on application of the stand-
ard of review12—a subject with which the Supreme Court did not engage much in 
Heller13—but there are new signs that federal courts are taking gun rights seri-
ously.14 
Moreover, many American jurisdictions have moved, particularly in the last 
decade, toward substantially more liberal gun possession legislation. Even in the 
                                                                
 5. 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016). 
 6. Id. at 2291 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor joined Parts I and II of the Thomas 
dissent, but did not join in Thomas’s language with respect to the Second Amendment. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 2292 (quoting Friedman v. Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2015) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari)).  See also Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2018) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari) (repeating criticisms of the federal judiciary’s treatment of Second Amend-
ment rights, and stating “[t]he Second Amendment is a disfavored right in this Court.”). 
 9. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 10. See generally J. Richard Broughton, The Ineludible (Constitutional) Politics of Guns, 46 CONN. 
L. REV. 1345 (2014) (discussing federal court litigation concerning federal firearms restrictions). Cf. Glenn 
Harlan Reynolds, Second Amendment Limitations, 14 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 243 (2016) (evaluating a few 
cases and noting that while many federal courts are “under-reading” Heller to limit firearms rights, “not all 
federal courts are as hostile to Second Amendment rights.”). 
 11. See generally Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 18–21 (2015). 
See infra Section IV.B.   
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 95 (3rd Cir. 2010). For a pre-Heller view 
of how to apply levels of scrutiny to gun restrictions, see Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2007). 
 13. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
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wake of repeated mass shootings, state legislatures have enacted numerous new 
laws to protect gun ownership and possession—from more liberal open carry laws 
to permissible carry in government buildings and on college campuses.15 States like 
Idaho, for example, have among the most permissive gun laws in the Nation: Idaho 
allows open carry of both handguns and long guns;16 prohibits (by state constitu-
tional provision) licensure or registration of firearms;17 allows open carry in restau-
rants that serve alcohol; and carry of a concealed loaded handgun in public without 
a permit.18  Of course, recent high-profile gun crimes may lead liberal gun-rights 
jurisdictions to reevaluate their policies and tighten some restrictions, but for now, 
many states will have generally permissive gun laws. 
The liberalization of gun rights, however, has created some conflict with crim-
inal law enforcement. It raises new questions about the ability of law enforcement 
officers to protect their own, and the public’s, safety, and to determine which gun 
owners pose a threat of danger to the community.19 Whether a particular form of 
gun possession renders the possessor dangerous, then, lends special significance to 
a line of cases that have received insufficient attention, and that implicate the in-
tersection of American gun law and constitutional criminal procedure rights under 
the Fourth Amendment. As one federal judge has said, “After Heller and McDonald, 
all of us involved in law enforcement, including judges, prosecutors, defense attor-
neys, and police officers, will need to reevaluate our thinking about these Fourth 
Amendment issues and how private possession of firearms figures into our think-
ing.”20 
In the landmark Terry v. Ohio decision, the Supreme Court rejected the notion 
that all police encounters that implicate the Fourth Amendment must be justified 
by the standard of probable cause.21 Rather, for brief investigative detentions, it is 
sufficient if the officer has reasonable suspicion that a crime is being or has been 
                                                                
 15. See Associated Press, States Expanded Gun Rights After Sandy Hook School Massacre, NBC 
NEWS (Dec. 13, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/states-expanded-gun-rights-after-sandy-
hook-school-massacre-n479216; Reid Wilson, Iowa Governor Signs Sweeping Expansion of Gun Rights, HILL 
(Apr. 13, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/328712-iowa-governor-signs-sweeping-expan-
sion-of-gun-rights; Lynn Hulsey, Ohio Gun Law that Takes Effect Today Continues State Loosening of Gun 
Restrictions,  DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/crime--law/ohio-
gun-law-that-takes-effect-today-continues-state-loosening-gun-re-
strictions/3czJ3tOwVUNKzmEqbwPz1N/; Associated Press, State Laws Expand Concealed Gun Rights to Col-
lege Campuses, Public Facilities, FOX NEWS (July 2, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/07/02/state-
laws-expand-concealed-gun-rights-to-college-campuses-public-facilities.html.  
 16. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302(4) (West 2016). 
 17. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11. 
 18. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302(3) (West 2016). 
 19. See Campbell Robertson & Timothy Williams, As States Expand Gun Rights, the Police Object, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/04/us/as-states-expand-gun-rights-police-
join-opposition.html. For recent commentary on the inherent dangerousness of guns as it relates to Terry, 
see Nadia Maraachli, The Fourth Amendment Shall Prevail, Come Heller High Water, 94 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
75 (2017); Matthew J. Wilkins, Armed and Not Dangerous? A Mistaken Treatment of Firearms in Terry Anal-
yses, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (2017). 
 20. United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 694 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment).  See also Bellin, supra note 11, at 4 (“dramatic changes in the nation’s sub-
stantive gun laws erode the constitutional underpinnings of urban gun policing.”). 
 21. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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committed.22 But the Court went even further, allowing officers not merely to de-
tain and question a suspect on reasonable suspicion, but also to conduct a pat down 
of the suspect’s outer clothing for weapons.23 Such a frisk, however, is justified only 
when the officer has additional reasonable suspicion that the suspect is “armed and 
presently dangerous.”24 
In a nation of liberalized gun laws, however, Terry’s standard for frisking a sus-
pect raises a problem: Is a person who is armed necessarily dangerous? Can one 
possess a firearm and yet not be subjected to a frisk because he is not, or cannot 
reasonably be suspected as, “presently” dangerous? This problem places American 
law squarely at the intersection of gun rights and Fourth Amendment rights. This 
Paper therefore explores that intersection and evaluates the various approaches to 
resolving this question about the scope of Terry. 
II. TERRY FRISKS IN THE SUPREME COURT 
The intersection of Terry doctrine and gun rights makes particular sense: Terry 
was actually a gun case. Recall that although Officer Martin McFadden suspected 
John W. Terry and his cohorts (Chilton and Katz) of casing the store on Huron Road 
in Cleveland for a Halloween robbery, his inclination to frisk them was based on his 
suspicion that the men were armed with guns.25 As it turned out, Terry and Chilton 
both had revolvers in their coats.26 Terry was charged not with robbery, or conspir-
acy, or attempt, but with carrying a concealed weapon.27 In determining whether 
possession of a firearm by itself is sufficient for a frisk (rather than for the stop), 
then, some attention must be given to the Court’s specific language. 
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court acknowledged that the “crux of 
[the] case” was not whether it was proper for Officer McFadden to investigate the 
suspicious behavior of Terry and his cohorts, but, rather, whether it was permissible 
to frisk them for weapons.28 The Court referred to the “more immediate interest of 
the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is 
dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used 
against him.”29 It also noted that it would be “unreasonable to require that police 
officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.”30 Consequently, 
when an officer is “justified” in believing that the suspect is “armed and presently 
                                                                
 22. Id. at 30.  “Reasonable suspicion” is not an utterance formally found in Terry, but Terry per-
mitted a brief investigative detention on less than probable cause and said the officer need only act “rea-
sonably.” Id. Therefore, subsequent cases have read Terry’s standard this way. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 
U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (summarizing the standard for a Terry stop). See also Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. 
Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 911, 95152 (1998) (summarizing the rule from 
Terry, as developed through subsequent cases). 
 23. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. at 5–6. For an interesting perspective on Officer McFadden and the circumstances of the 
initial stop, see Louis Stokes, Representing John W. Terry, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 727 (1998). 
 26. Terry, 392 U.S. at 7. 
 27. Id. at 4. 
 28. Id. at 23. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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dangerous to the officer or to others,” it is reasonable to permit the officer to frisk 
the suspect’s outer clothing for weapons.31 
And yet Terry was careful to balance this interest against the personal security 
and rights of the suspect. A pat-down is a “severe, though brief intrusion upon” the 
security of the individual.32 And while the Court rejected Terry’s contention that 
such a pat-down ought to be permissible only as incident to arrest and upon prob-
able cause, it was careful to place limits on the officer’s ability to conduct the frisk.33 
The officer’s judgment may not be based on inarticulate hunches, but rather must 
be based on “specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the 
facts in light of his experience.”34 The Court further explained that the frisk must 
occur in the course of the investigation of the suspect’s behavior and where the 
officer has identified himself and made “reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in 
the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own 
or others’ safety[.]”35 The frisk is not a search for criminal evidence and must end 
once the suspect has been disarmed or the officer learns that the suspect was un-
armed.36 
Terry, then, while accounting for the Fourth Amendment rights of criminal 
suspects, looks very different from the less law-enforcement-friendly decisions for 
which the Warren Court was, to its critics, notorious.37 Moreover, the background 
of the Terry opinion and its author offers a window into Terry’s focus on officer 
safety. The son of a father who was murdered,38 Warren spent over two decades in 
law enforcement, as a deputy district attorney, district attorney, and Attorney Gen-
eral of California.39 Although his professional experience did not always lead him to 
side with the government in criminal cases, as Yale Kamisar writes, “[o]f all the opin-
ions Warren wrote in his decade and a half on the Court, his opinion in Terry best 
demonstrates his kinship with the police and his concern for their safety.”40 And as 
                                                                
 31. Id. at 24. 
 32. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24–25. 
 33. Id. at 26. 
 34. Id. at 27. 
 35. Id. at 30. 
 36. Id. The Court had occasion to apply this standard the same day that it decided Terry. In Sibron 
v. New York, an officer had observed the suspect meeting over the course of several hours with known drug 
users. 392 U.S. 40, 45 (1968). The officer had no information about Sibron or his activities. Id. When the 
officer approached Sibron outside of a restaurant where he had been seen with three known drug users, 
the officer said to Sibron, “you know what I am after.” Id. Sibron reached into his pocket, at which point the 
officer also reached into the same pocket and found heroin. Id. The Court held that the frisk of Sibron was 
unconstitutional under Terry because the officer had no reasonable suspicion that Sibron was even armed, 
much less armed and dangerous. Id. at 64. Rather, it was clear to the Court that the officer was searching 
for drugs, as the officer had not indicated any fear about Sibron possessing a weapon. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., KENNETH W. STARR, FIRST AMONG EQUALS: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 176–90 
(2002) (criticizing Warren Court criminal procedure rulings); cf. Stephen F. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and 
Criminal Procedure, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1337 (2002) (discussing Rehnquist Court roll-backs of Warren Court 
criminal procedure doctrine). 
 38. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT: A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 
11–12 (1983). 
 39. Yale Kamisar, How Earl Warren’s Twenty-Two Years in Law Enforcement Affected His Work 
as Chief Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 11, 12 (2005).  
 40. Id. at 31.  See also Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, the Warren Court, and the Fourth Amend-
ment: A Law Clerk’s Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 891, 903 (1998) (stating “my experience with Chief 
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Ed Cray writes in his biography of Chief Justice Warren, although there were con-
cerns on the Court about granting police a “hunting license” in Terry, Warren nev-
ertheless “would find the necessary justification not in the behavior of the suspect 
but in the realities of police work.”41 Those realities were laid bare for the Court, 
and the country, when one considers the turbulent and violent months that pre-
ceded the Terry opinion.42 Terry was handed down on June 10, 1968. By that time, 
Americans had witnessed their share of violence: the assassination of Martin Luther 
King Jr. happened in April, and violence had erupted in the streets of Chicago (even 
before the Democratic Convention later that summer) and earlier in Detroit and 
Newark.43 Five days before Terry was delivered, Senator Robert F. Kennedy was as-
sassinated in a packed hotel ballroom in California while campaigning for Presi-
dent.44 In light of the public violence that Americans had experienced in recent 
months, as well as the statistics on the killing of police officers in the performance 
of their duties that the Chief Justice’s opinion cited45—and understanding the criti-
cisms that the Warren Court had sustained as being unfriendly to law enforce-
ment46—it is unsurprising that the Court would craft an opinion protective of police 
officers in dealing with armed suspects. 
Since 1968, though, the Court has seldom grappled with questions about the 
propriety of a frisk of the suspect. In Terry, the Court did not clearly describe the 
legal standard for the frisk (nor, for that matter, for the stop), other than that it 
must be justified by reasonable belief that the suspect is presently armed and dan-
gerous. It was in subsequent cases that the reasonable suspicion standard 
evolved.47 Consider, too, Justice Harlan’s important Terry concurrence. He argued 
that the authority to conduct a frisk should be “immediate and automatic” where 
the suspect is stopped for a violent crime,48 though he further clarified that position 
                                                                
Justice Warren convinced me that he was, above all, an enormously practical man, well-schooled in the craft 
of government, and best schooled in the practice of law enforcement, which was his field for the majority 
of his career.”). 
 41. ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 467 (1997). 
 42. See Kamisar, supra note 39, at 31–32 (Kamisar agrees with Francis Allen’s observations that 
the “period was a time of social upheaval, violence in the ghettos, and disorder on campuses. Fears of the 
breakdown of public order were widespread. Inevitably, the issue of law and order was politically ex-
ploited.”); Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 
1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 539 (1975). Allen concluded, “[t]hese events combined to create an atmosphere that, 
to say the least, was unfavorable to the continued vitality of the Warren Court’s mission in criminal cases.” 
Id.  
 43. For a description of this and other violence in the late 1960s, and its impact on American 
politics, see MICHAEL A. COHEN, AMERICAN MAELSTROM: THE 1968 ELECTION AND THE POLITICS OF DIVISION 28 (2016). 
See also LAWRENCE O’DONNELL, PLAYING WITH FIRE: THE 1968 ELECTION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS 381, 416 (2017). O’Donnell writes, “This was the summer of 1968—the summer of riots and assas-
sinations.” Id. at 435. 
 44. O’DONNELL, supra note 43, at 425–26 (describing Kennedy’s assassination). 
 45. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 n.21. 
 46. See Kamisar, supra note 39, at 11. 
 47. See Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 962–63 (discussing cases that developed reasonable suspi-
cion standard). 
 48. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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in his Sibron concurrence.49 Where the Court has dealt with the frisk, however, it 
has cast some doubt on the idea that an officer must make inquiries before con-
ducting a frisk based on reasonable suspicion, as well as on the idea that the mere 
legality of gun possession is sufficient to preclude the frisk. 
Adams v. Williams is a significant frisk case50—perhaps as important as Terry—
and yet it involved the seizure of a weapon by something other than a traditional 
pat-down pursuant to a stop. A Bridgeport, Connecticut, police officer received a 
tip from a known informant that Williams was in his car with a handgun and narcot-
ics.51 Rather than opening the door as the officer had requested, Williams lowered 
the car window, at which point the officer reached into the car and pulled a loaded 
revolver from Williams’s waistband.52 The officer could not initially see the firearm 
from outside the vehicle, but it was where the informant said it would be.53 A sub-
sequent search of the car revealed heroin, a machete, and another revolver.54 
Upholding the seizure of the gun, the Court reiterated that the purpose of the 
Terry frisk is not to uncover evidence of a crime but to “allow the officer to pursue 
his investigation without fear of violence, and thus the frisk for weapons might be 
equally necessary and reasonable, whether or not carrying a concealed weapon vi-
olated any applicable state law.”55 As long as the officer has “reason to believe that 
the suspect is armed and dangerous,” the officer may conduct a limited frisk for 
weapons.56 Here, the officer had “ample reason to fear for his safety” because Wil-
liams did not comply with the request to open the door, thus making it reasonable 
for the officer to reach for the place where the informant had said that the gun 
would be.57 The Court also dropped a footnote supplying statistics on police officer 
shootings. “According to one study,” the Court said, “approximately 30% of police 
shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an auto-
mobile.”58 
And in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the Court upheld a frisk where a driver had 
been asked to exit his car and the officer noticed a bulge in the driver’s jacket.59 
Philadelphia police stopped Mimms for driving on an expired license plate.60 When 
Mimms exited, one of the officers noticed the bulge and immediately conducted a 
                                                                
 49. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 74 (1968). (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan said that “[i]f 
the nature of the suspected offense creates no reasonable apprehension for the officer’s safety, I would not 
permit him to frisk unless other circumstances did so.”  Id. 
 50. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). Saltzburg argues that Justice Harlan’s concurrence 
became “the legacy of Terry” after Williams.  Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 944. 
 51. Williams, 407 U.S. at 144–45. 
 52. Id. at 145. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 146. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Williams, 407 U.S. at 147–48. 
 58. Id. at 148 n.3. 
 59. 434 U.S. 106, 107 (1977). 
 60. Id. 
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frisk.61 The frisk uncovered a firearm with five live rounds.62 Mimms was prosecuted 
for carrying an unlicensed firearm and a concealed deadly weapon.63 
Even though the police had no reason to suspect Mimms of committing a vio-
lent crime, the Court found the frisk reasonable.64 Once the officer noticed the 
bulge in Mimms’s jacket, the officer was permitted to conclude that “Mimms was 
armed and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer. In 
these circumstances, any man of ‘reasonable caution’ would have conducted the 
‘pat down.’”65 
After Williams and Mimms, then, it appears as though the Court does not re-
quire any meaningful inquiry prior to a frisk, so long as the officer has an objectively 
reasonable basis for conducting the frisk in the absence of an inquiry. This infor-
mation can come from an informant’s tip, as in Williams, or from the officer’s per-
sonal observation of the suspect, as in Mimms. In neither case did the Court require 
that the officer ask questions to gain specific information about the threat that the 
suspect may pose. Nor did the Court require inquiry into the legality of the suspect’s 
weapons possession. And language from both Williams and Mimms suggests that 
in each case the weapons possession was by itself sufficient to justify a frisk.66 Per-
haps these cases implicitly tell us how police must treat a suspect who they suspect 
to be armed but for whom no additional evidence of dangerousness is then known 
to the investigating officer. Yet, they were all decided before the development of 
modern Second Amendment case law and the contemporary expansion of state-
law gun rights. Does that matter? 
III. FIREARMS AND TERRY IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS 
It is perfectly lawful to carry any number of items that could also be used as 
weapons against an officer or others—baseball bats, scissors, fountain pens, letter 
openers. But firearms, unlike these other items, are specifically designed for killing 
or injuring; they have no other function. To be sure, one may merely collect fire-
arms, but collectors do not typically carry their collections in public, in their waist-
bands or a holster. Moreover, one may carry his firearm on a daily stroll or to the 
firing range to practice shooting, without any specific desire to use the weapon 
against someone. But arguably the reason he possesses the gun in the first place is 
to make himself dangerous to others, even if lawfully so, in the case of confronta-
tion. The dangers created by firearm possession may even arguably be heightened 
in police encounters, where nervousness and tension can affect rational thought. In 
those situations, one may credibly argue, it is not unreasonable for an officer to 
believe that the mere possession of the firearm makes the suspect dangerous, even 
if the suspect otherwise poses—and intends to pose—no threat to anyone. The of-
ficer often cannot readily know the suspect’s intentions. Of course, baseball bats, 
scissors, and letter openers are not the subject of specific constitutional protec-
                                                                
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 112. 
 65. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 112 (emphasis added). 
 66. See Williams, 407 U.S. at 147–48; Mimms, 434 U.S. at 112.   
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tions. And the kind of protections given to firearms in the Second Amendment ex-
tends even more broadly when one considers some state law. So, in a jurisdiction 
with liberalized laws about public carrying of firearms, two questions arise: first, is 
a Terry stop permissible merely on the basis of gun possession? And second, assum-
ing a legitimate basis for a stop, is it reasonable for a police officer to believe that 
suspect is dangerous because he is armed with a gun? The cases in this section ex-
plore those distinct questions, though this article’s primary focus is on the latter. 
A. The Significance of United States v. Robinson 
The Fourth Circuit’s recent en banc decision in United States v. Robinson ad-
dresses this dilemma involving Terry frisks of suspected gun possessors after a law-
ful stop in a liberal gun rights jurisdiction.67 Local police in Ranson, West Virginia, 
received an anonymous tip from an eyewitness that a “‘black [man] in a blueish 
greenish Toyota Camry’” had just loaded a gun and “conceal[ed] it in his pocket[.]”68 
This incident occurred in the parking lot of a Ranson 7-Eleven, a high-crime area 
known for drug transactions.69 The tip was relayed to two officers who responded 
to the call.70 Officer Kendall Hudson soon observed the Camry.71 A white woman 
drove, with a black male passenger.72 Officer Hudson stopped the vehicle for a seat-
belt violation.73 After asking for identification, and concerned that Robinson might 
be armed, Officer Hudson asked Robinson to exit the vehicle.74 Police Captain Rob-
bie Roberts then arrived and asked Robinson if he had weapons.75 Without respond-
ing, Robinson gave the captain “a weird look.”76 At that point, Captain Roberts per-
formed a frisk of Robinson’s person and recovered a loaded handgun from Robin-
son’s front pants pocket.77 
Captain Roberts recognized that Robinson was a convicted felon, and Robin-
son was arrested.78 He was eventually prosecuted by the United States pursuant to 
the federal felon-in-possession statute79 and entered a conditional guilty plea after 
the district court denied his motion to suppress the gun.80 After initial reversal on 
appeal, the en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress.81 
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Robinson argued that even if the officers had reasonable suspicion that he was 
armed, they lacked reasonable suspicion that he was dangerous.82 According to 
Robinson, because West Virginia law permitted concealed carry of a licensed gun, 
and because the officers could not have known at the time whether Robinson’s gun 
was licensed, they had no Fourth Amendment justification for the conclusion that 
he was presently dangerous.83 
Rejecting Robinson’s contention, Judge Niemeyer’s opinion for the en banc 
majority focused on two notions: first, that there are inherent dangers in certain 
police stops, including traffic stops, and that the danger to officers inherent in those 
stops is magnified when the suspect is armed;84 and second, that the suspect’s dan-
gerousness does not dissipate merely because the suspect possesses a weapon law-
fully.85 Connecting the risks inherent in Terry stops to the standard for justifying a 
Terry frisk, the court cited Terry when saying, “when the officer reasonably suspects 
that the person he has stopped is armed, the officer ‘is warranted in the belief that 
his safety . . . [is] in danger[.]’”86 
Note the categorical manner in which the Fourth Circuit phrases its legal con-
clusion. The court does not say that the officer “may be” warranted in the belief 
that he is in danger; rather, the officer “is” warranted in such belief.87 Relying on 
both Terry and Mimms, the court said that the Fourth Amendment requires only a 
lawful stop under Terry and reasonable suspicion that the suspect is “armed and 
therefore dangerous[,]”88 concluding that Terry and Mimms had “deliberately 
linked ‘armed’ and ‘dangerous[.]’”89 In other words, once the officer possesses rea-
sonable suspicion that the suspect is armed (as was true with Robinson) there is no 
need for a distinct inquiry into the suspect’s dangerousness. The suspect is auto-
matically dangerous if he is armed. Effectively, “dangerous” is rendered superfluous 
once “armed” is established. 
Moreover, it does not matter that the underlying gun possession is lawful. Alt-
hough Robinson noted that, in Mimms, Pennsylvania law made the concealed carry 
illegal, whereas West Virginia law permitted concealed carry of a licensed gun, the 
court found that Williams makes clear that the distinction is irrelevant.90 The pur-
pose of the Terry frisk, Williams said, “is not to discover evidence of a crime, but to 
allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence, and thus the 
frisk for weapons might be equally necessary and reasonable, whether or not car-
rying a concealed weapon violated any applicable state law.”91 Even without the aid 
of the language from Williams, the Fourth Circuit said the presumptive lawfulness 
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of weapons possession tells us nothing about whether the officer’s concern for his 
safety is reasonable.92 
Now compare the majority’s categorical (or per se) approach in Robinson with 
the views of the Robinson separate opinions. 
First, it is fair to ask: would the majority’s conclusion about inherent danger-
ousness be different if the suspected weapon was not a gun? Judge Wynn implicitly 
raises this question in his Robinson concurrence.93 He asks whether, using the cate-
gorical approach to dangerousness, a person suspected of carrying a wine bottle 
could automatically be frisked, because a wine bottle can be dangerous.94 The only 
way to reconcile the majority’s “absurd” approach to the frisk analysis is to concede 
that firearms are unique.95 Once one makes such a concession—which Judge Wynn 
justifies by examining both case law and public policy related to firearms as inher-
ently dangerous items—one must confront the claim that the frisk analysis, if 
unique to firearms, imposes a burden on gun owners that it does not impose on 
others who possess items that may be dangerous to officers but are simply not 
guns.96 Judge Wynn’s approach is that “individuals who carry firearms elect to sub-
ject themselves to being frisked when lawfully stopped by law enforcement offic-
ers.”97 This, he argues, is consistent with the conclusion that other provisions of the 
Constitution—including the Second Amendment itself, the First Amendment, and 
the Fourth Amendment—all impose burdens on gun possessors because of the risks 
posed to law enforcement and third parties.98 
Judge Harris’s Robinson dissent is distinctly protective of contemporary gun 
rights. Not only does she reject a categorical approach, particularly one aimed at 
guns, she also concludes that the proper Fourth Amendment approach is one that 
engages in an independent inquiry into whether the suspect—even one carrying a 
gun—is dangerous.99 While she acknowledges that in past years public carrying 
might have given rise to the conclusion that the carrier was a dangerous law-
breaker, modern firearms law has granted substantially more legal protection to 
citizens as gun owners.100 Accordingly, “we no longer may take for granted the same 
correlation between ‘armed’ and ‘dangerous.’ . . . I cannot endorse a rule that puts 
us on a collision course with rights to gun possession rooted in the Second Amend-
ment and conferred by state legislatures.”101 
The dissent makes the point that this changing legal landscape alters Terry’s 
application. Although she acknowledges that guns are “in some sense intrinsically 
dangerous[,]”102 once the legislature has seen fit to grant citizens the legal right to 
publicly carry firearms, a court cannot fairly conclude that each and every citizen 
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carrying a firearm is necessarily dangerous.103 Doing so would undermine the very 
judgment of the legislative body that granted the right to carry in the first place.104 
According to the dissent’s reasoning, then, once the legislature concludes that pub-
lic carrying of firearms is legally permissible, it is constitutionally unreasonable to 
conclude that the person possessing the firearm is necessarily dangerous, in the 
absence of some other factor or factors that would independently produce a finding 
of dangerousness. The dissent, therefore, would treat the legal status of public carry 
as a significant factor in the analysis, and require an independent determination of 
dangerousness, thus avoiding the Williams problem that the majority identifies. 
Williams, the dissent says, states only that a “lawfully possessed firearm can pose a 
threat to officer safety[,]” not that it necessarily does.105 
Three distinct approaches emerge from Robinson. First, the categorical ap-
proach of Judge Niemeyer’s majority opinion, in which reasonable suspicion that a 
suspect is armed is per se sufficient to conclude that the suspect is dangerous and 
to conduct a frisk.106 Second, the modified categorical approach—or, perhaps more 
precisely, the firearms-only categorical approach—of Judge Wynn, in which reason-
able suspicion that a suspect is armed with a weapon is sufficient to conclude that 
the suspect is dangerous and to conduct a frisk if the suspected weapon is a fire-
arm.107 And third, the independent dangerousness approach, which treats the sus-
pect’s dangerousness as a separate and distinct inquiry, and permits a frisk only if 
the suspect is deemed to be dangerous based on factors other than mere weapons 
possession.108 
B. Terry Cases Accounting for Constitutional and State Law Gun Rights 
Other lower court decisions, on their face, suggest that Robinson’s holding is 
an outlier. This reading of the case law may, however, prove deceptive. Nonethe-
less, a number of other cases have been far more protective of legislative judgments 
about the trust placed in citizens to carry guns in public. In this sense, they lend 
credibility to the independent dangerousness approach, even if those cases—as I 
explain here—address slightly different problems than the problem that Robinson 
addressed. 
Judge Harris’s Robinson dissent cites United States v. Black, a Fourth Circuit 
case that produced a holding consistent with the independent dangerousness ap-
proach (it was not cited by the Robinson majority).109 Black was arrested after being 
seen with a group of other men in the parking lot of an apartment complex in a 
high-crime area of Charlotte, North Carolina.110 Police had followed one of the other 
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men—Troupe—after suspecting him of engaging in a drug transaction.111 When po-
lice approached the group of men, Troupe raised his hands and indicated to officers 
that he had a holstered gun.112 Troupe’s gun was seized.113 Police eventually fo-
cused attention on Black, who began to leave and was told he could not.114 He then 
fled, was chased, and tackled.115 A frisk uncovered a firearm and Black was indicted 
pursuant to the federal felon-in-possession statute.116 
The Fourth Circuit held that police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop 
Black.117 Rejecting the Government’s claim that Troupe’s firearm possession could 
serve as a factor in the development of reasonable suspicion, the court noted the 
legality of open carry in North Carolina.118 The panel stated that “where a state per-
mits individuals to openly carry firearms, the exercise of this right, without more, 
cannot justify an investigatory detention. Permitting such a justification would evis-
cerate Fourth Amendment protections for lawfully armed individuals in those 
states.”119 Consequently, the police could not justify Troupe’s detention and, as a 
result, could not use that detention as a basis for detaining Black.120 
Similarly, in Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Department,121 the Sixth Circuit 
emphatically distinguished between being merely armed, on the one hand, and be-
ing armed and dangerous, on the other.122 Northrup went for a walk with his wife, 
daughter, grandson, dog, and a semiautomatic handgun visibly placed on his hip.123 
His wife, Denise, exchanged unpleasant words with a passerby, Rose, who com-
plained to Northrup: “[y]ou can’t walk around with a gun like that!”124 Rose called 
911 to report Northrup’s open carry.125 Despite acknowledging that Ohio law per-
mitted open carry with a concealed-carry weapon permit (CCW), and despite Rose 
expressing no desire to call for a police response if Northrup’s carry was legal, the 
dispatcher nonetheless called for an officer.126 When Officer David Bright arrived 
and spotted Northrup, he seized the firearm and asked for both a driver’s license 
and CCW from Northrup, who provided the driver’s license.127 Denise then told Of-
ficer Bright to research the CCW himself, at which point Bright arrested Northrup 
for “inducing panic.”128 After Officer Bright confirmed Northrup’s CCW, and after 
another officer arrived on the scene, he released Northrup with a citation for failing 
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to disclose personal information.129 The state dropped that charge and Northrup 
filed a civil suit against the police department and the two officers.130 
Although the second officer enjoyed qualified immunity, Officer Bright did 
not.131 The requirement of establishing that a suspect is both armed and dangerous, 
“and the impropriety of Officer Bright’s demands are particularly acute in a state 
like Ohio[,]” Judge Sutton’s opinion for the court said.132 “Not only has the State 
made open carry of a firearm legal, but it also does not require gun owners to pro-
duce or even carry their licenses for inquiring officers.”133 
Judge Sutton’s opinion also rejected the various proposed justifications for the 
stop of Northrup, including Officer Bright’s contention that if he had not conducted 
an investigatory stop of Northrup, there remained the possibility that Northrup 
could begin shooting and endanger the public.134 According to the opinion, Officer 
Bright could have engaged in a consensual encounter with Northrup to make an 
initial determination of his dangerousness.135 But absent reasonable suspicion of 
Northrup’s dangerousness, “Bright’s hope that Northrup ‘was not about to start 
shooting’ remains another word for the trust that Ohioans have placed in their 
State’s approach to gun licensure and gun possession.”136 The court concluded, 
“[w]hile open-carry laws may put police officers (and some motorcyclists) in awk-
ward situations from time to time, the Ohio legislature has decided its citizens may 
be entrusted with firearms on public streets.”137 
United States v. Ubiles138 is also noteworthy for its reference to local gun law. 
But like these other cases decided before Robinson, its focus is on the validity of the 
initial stop rather than the frisk. It also predates Heller and the modern Second 
Amendment cases. In Ubiles, an informant approached law enforcement officers 
during a festival on St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands.139 The informant stated that a 
man in the crowd possessed a gun, though he did not state how he knew this nor 
did he offer any other facts that would have indicated that the man was behaving 
suspiciously or illegally.140 One of the officers approached the man (Ubiles) but 
could not tell whether he was armed.141 The officer—who later testified that he was 
“very concerned about the situation”142—frisked Ubiles and found a machete and a 
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.22 caliber pistol, which allegedly had an obliterated serial number.143 Ubiles was 
acquitted of the federal charge that he possessed a firearm with an obliterated se-
rial number, but was convicted of the territorial charge of possessing an unlicensed 
firearm.144 
The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the officer lacked reasonable suspi-
cion.145 Noting that local law permitted firearm possession “in a crowd or at a car-
nival,” the court said that a mere allegation of firearm possession does not suffice 
for a Terry stop and frisk.146 “For all the officers knew, even assuming the reliability 
of the tip that Ubiles possessed a gun, Ubiles was another celebrant lawfully exer-
cising his right under Virgin Islands law to possess a gun in public.”147 The court 
analogized the case to an allegation that a man in the crowd possessed a wallet, the 
possession of which is legal.148 Even if a subsequent search of the wallet revealed 
the illegal possession of counterfeit bills, there would be no justification for stop-
ping and frisking the man simply on the allegation that he possessed a wallet.149 
Finally, consider United States v. Leo.150 A police officer in Racine, Wisconsin, 
spotted two young men in black hooded sweatshirts—Leo and Aranda—on a side-
walk before they ran into the yard of a duplex.151 Thereafter, the police dispatcher 
announced a call from 911 about a possible burglary in the very duplex where the 
officer saw Leo and Aranda.152 The caller described the burglars as “two Hispanic 
men wearing black hoodies, one of them with a gun, possibly a revolver[,]” and said 
that an unmarked police car had just passed.153 The officer waited for backup and 
again saw Aranda and Leo walk toward a Head Start preschool, with Leo now wear-
ing a red top and carrying a backpack.154 The officer finally approached them as they 
continued toward the preschool entrance, stopped them, and—with the assistance 
of another officer, who detained Leo when he did not stop—both Aranda and Leo 
were handcuffed.155 
The 911 caller, who lived in the upstairs unit of the duplex, identified both Leo 
and Aranda as the two men he had seen trying to enter the lower unit.156 He was 
mistaken about the burglary, however, according to the police interview of the 
lower unit residents, who said they knew Aranda and Leo.157 By then, however, it 
was too late for Leo. A search of his person did not yield any weapons, but—while 
he was handcuffed and while the backpack was out of the grabbing area—an im-
mediate search of his backpack revealed a black hooded sweatshirt, a digital scale 
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with marijuana residue, plastics bags, three bullets, and a loaded revolver.158 The 
Government indicted him pursuant to the felon-in-possession statute.159 
Leo conceded the validity of the stop, but challenged the search of the back-
pack.160 The Seventh Circuit agreed that the search violated Terry, which was the 
sole basis on which the Government attempted to defend the search.161 According 
to the court, although there are limited circumstances in which the police may ex-
tend a Terry frisk beyond the person of the suspect, this was not such a case.162 At 
the time of the backpack search, “it was inconceivable that either Leo or Aranda 
would have been able to lunge for the bag, unzip it, and grab the gun inside.”163 The 
officers’ suspicions may not have been fully dispelled by the initial stop and frisk of 
Leo’s person, but to enter the backpack, the officers needed probable cause.164 The 
Government did not even attempt to justify the detention and backpack search on 
probable cause grounds.165 
But the court went even farther in rejecting the Government’s contention that 
fears about Leo entering the Head Start school with a gun justified the backpack 
search. The court noted that the Head Start program was not a “school” under Wis-
consin law, and thus carrying a gun there would not have violated the federal or 
state gun-free school zone laws.166 Also, the concealed carry law in Wisconsin limits 
the rights of convicted felons or persons under age twenty-one, but the officers did 
not know Leo’s age or criminal history when they seized him, nor did they inquire.167 
The court finally noted the circuit precedent that permits public carry of a firearm 
pursuant to the Second Amendment.168 Therefore, “considering these important 
developments in Second Amendment law together with Wisconsin’s gun laws,” the 
court was compelled to reject the Government’s justification for search without es-
tablishing probable cause.169 
C. Distinguishing Stops and Frisks 
It is important to distinguish the cases involving the constitutionality of the 
frisk from cases involving the constitutionality of the stop at its inception, based 
simply on the claim of a weapon. 
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The Supreme Court held in Florida v. J.L. that an anonymous tip must bear 
“sufficient indicia of reliability” to justify a Terry stop,170 and rejected a call from 
both Florida and the Federal Government to establish a firearms exception that 
would permit a stop and frisk anytime a tip describes the presence of a firearm.171 
Black, Northrup, and Ubiles are really cases about the constitutionality of the stop—
the seizures of Black (and Troupe), Northrup, and Ubiles were unlawful, and thus 
their firearms were the fruit of that initial illegality.172 Perhaps this explains why the 
Robinson majority cites none of them; in Robinson, there was reasonable suspicion 
for the stop.173 Cases like Black, Northrup, and Ubiles are useful to the conversation 
because they rely explicitly on state gun law to establish limits on the scope of 
Terry.174 Still, those cases ask whether mere gun possession is sufficient to establish 
the criminality predicate for an investigative stop.175 Unlike Robinson, they do not 
ask whether, once the criminality predicate is established, the gun possession ren-
ders a suspect sufficiently dangerous to justify the frisk.176 
Leo sits somewhere between those cases and a case like Robinson. As in Rob-
inson, there was no serious question in Leo about the legality of the stop, or even 
about the lawfulness of patting down the exterior of Leo’s backpack.177 And yet, the 
Seventh Circuit’s language about the scope of Second Amendment and Wisconsin 
gun law appears to be only dicta. After all, if police needed probable cause to search 
the backpack because the nature of the detention was such that it was now a de 
facto arrest, then even if the police had reasonable suspicion for the backpack it 
would not have mattered.178 Of course, this gun rights language in Leo appears to 
suggest that if the fears of the police about Leo taking the gun into the Head Start 
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program were legitimate, this might have made some difference.179 But it is hard to 
see why, if the remainder of the court’s opinion is correct. Michigan v. Long would 
not have helped the Government because that case involved a car search in which 
the suspect could have gained immediate control of a weapon.180 The same is true 
of Cady v. Sheahan, the Seventh Circuit precedent on which the Government relied 
where the suspect also posed an immediate threat based on his control of the con-
tainer in that case.181 
Leo therefore seems to stand for the proposition that a Terry frisk of a con-
tainer is justified only when the container is situated such that the suspect could 
still gain immediate control of it and harm the officer. An armed suspect therefore 
cannot be “dangerous” within Terry’s meaning if he has no control over the fire-
arm.182 This is different, though, than a claim that suspected possession of a firearm 
does not necessarily justify a frisk. After all, no one contested the fact that the police 
had enough reasonable suspicion to pat down Leo’s person or the backpack, where 
the 911 caller had indicated the presence of a gun and the police did not know 
where the gun was located at the time of the initial stop.183 
Robinson, therefore, is not as incompatible with the other lower court case 
law as it might at first appear to be. Synthesizing these cases requires, as Robinson 
does, appreciating the distinction between the justification for the initial stop and 
the justification for the frisk.184 Clearly an officer cannot conduct a frisk if he cannot 
first conduct a lawful seizure of the person, or otherwise lawfully encounter the 
person.185 This is true even if he knows that the object of his attention is armed, but 
lacks reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a crime or that criminal 
activity is afoot, and otherwise has no lawful basis for the encounter or for 
a search.186 But in cases where there is reasonable suspicion for an initial stop based 
on the predicate of criminal activity—like Robinson—the question then is whether 
knowledge (or at least reasonable suspicion) that the suspect is armed is an objec-
tively reasonable basis to conclude dangerousness for the frisk. Perhaps, as we as-
sess the significance of an approach that is appropriately respectful of gun rights, it 
is helpful also to remember Terry’s criminality predicate. 
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IV. THE CRIMINALITY PREDICATE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REASONABLENESS 
There is some juridical and political sense in the appeal to modern-day gun 
rights that is found in cases like Leo, Black, Northrup, and Ubiles, and in the Robinson 
dissent. If we are to avoid relegating gun rights to second-class status, as Justice 
Thomas warns, then perhaps a Terry frisk approach that explicitly acknowledges 
these rights would appear desirable. And yet, as the Supreme Court has said (and 
Justice Thomas joined in saying), Second Amendment rights are “not unlimited.”187 
Neither are state-created gun rights. And the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that guns are dangerous.188 There remains room, even in a legal culture that re-
spects gun possession and the need for lawful self-defense, for judgments about 
who may and may not possess guns based on the threats gun possession can pose 
to good civil order and public safety. A categorical approach to the frisk, or even a 
modified, firearms-only categorical approach, might seem to better fit the realities 
of everyday life even in a liberalized gun culture, the kind of reality that law enforce-
ment officers in the field must encounter daily. The question, then, is how to con-
stitutionally assess dangerousness in the context of firearms possession. That is, 
how does an officer make a constitutionally acceptable ex ante determination of 
suspect dangerousness based on firearm possession, where Terry’s criminality 
predicate is already satisfied? 
A. Armed As Dangerous, Even If Trusted 
Heller was limited to gun possession in the home.189 It may well be that the 
Second Amendment protects a right to carry a firearm outside of the home, but one 
must find that right beyond Heller’s core holding (as some courts have done).190 This 
does not fully answer the Terry frisk problem, however, because even if the Second 
Amendment does not extend to public carry (which is debatable), state law gun 
rights do. Also, one may argue—as several commentators have and as the Supreme 
Court has—that guns are inherently dangerous.191 Even assuming this to be true, 
however, it also does not finally resolve the Terry frisk question if gun rights are 
relevant to the analysis. It may fairly be said of the Second Amendment’s framers, 
and of modern legislatures, that they chose to protect gun rights with full 
knowledge of the dangers that guns pose. Rather, the proper approach to assessing 
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Terry-style dangerousness in the context of liberalized gun rights may lie in a com-
bination of gun-dangerousness, the realities of law enforcement, and the balance 
to be struck when making Fourth Amendment reasonableness determinations. 
The view expressed by Judges Sutton and Harris reads the legislative trend as 
expressing the government’s position that persons who carry in public are not dan-
gerous because the liberalization of gun law reflects a legislative determination that 
citizens can be trusted with guns outside of the confines of the home. That is one 
sensible way of interpreting these legislative judgments. But there are limits to this 
reasoning. 
To the extent that the right to public carry is a statutorily created one or that 
it falls within the ambit of Second Amendment protection, consider whether the 
message sent is precisely the opposite of the one that Judges Sutton and Harris ad-
vocate. Even if legal, even if trusted, the point of permitting public carry—open or 
concealed—is to allow one to be dangerous in the case of a confrontation. Indeed, 
open carry seems designed to send that very message openly—to affirmatively 
make known to others (potential opponents) that one is dangerous. Particularly if 
we accept the premise of Heller, that the core of the Second Amendment is to safe-
guard the privilege of self-defense in times of confrontation,192 then it is sensible to 
believe that no person carries a gun outside of the home unless his intention is to 
use the gun in the case of confrontation. And in such situations, one presumably 
hopes to be a danger to anyone he or she must confront (hence the gun).193 Alt-
hough one may surely carry a firearm without the hope of ever using it—and per-
haps most public carriers do not hope to use their weapon—one probably does not 
carry a weapon with the hopes of not being dangerous to a potential bad guy. 
The independent inquiry approach, then, appears to be based on the premise 
of law-abiding citizens exercising their legally-proscribed gun possession rights, ra-
ther than assuming those citizens to be dangerous to law enforcement.194 That, too, 
is sensible. But this approach overlooks a key factor: often, in the field, in the short 
time in which police encounters occur (and can go very badly), and with very limited 
information about a suspect,195 law enforcement officers cannot know which gun 
possessors are the good guys and which are the bad guys. Their discretion must be 
exercised promptly; with every second, in dealing with an armed suspect, the po-
tential danger to the officer increases.196 
The language from, and underlying theory of, Terry is instructive. Terry was 
concerned with the police officer “taking steps to assure himself that the person 
with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and 
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fatally be used against him.”197 The Terry Court acknowledged that some of the 
most potent dangers to officers in the field are not the expected or predictable 
ones. Rather, it is the unexpected danger against which an officer must have the 
ability to guard.198 And, the Court said, it would be unreasonable to force officers 
to take unnecessary risks.199 It may, of course, be true that not every armed suspect 
poses an actual danger to the officer. Neither Terry nor Williams nor Mimms says 
otherwise. But the officer does not necessarily know which ones are and which ones 
are not. “[T]he issue[,]” the Court stated, “is whether a reasonably prudent man in 
the circumstances, would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others 
was in danger.”200 The Court repeated this theme in Mimms201 and has repeatedly 
acknowledged the officer safety rationale that justifies Terry frisks.202 
The problem with the independent dangerousness/inquiry approach, then, is 
not simply that it misapprehends or understates the nature of dangerousness. It is 
that it dilutes the text of the Fourth Amendment, obscuring a reasonableness in-
quiry with an inquiry that uses the balancing of gun rights with search and seizure 
rights to focus on the likelihood of dangerousness. But the text of the Fourth 
Amendment requires only that the search be reasonable. It may be true that a par-
ticular armed suspect is not actually dangerous to the officer. But that is not the 
relevant question. The question is whether it is reasonable for the officer to believe 
that an armed suspect who has been stopped in connection with a crime is danger-
ous, even if the officer later turns out to be wrong.203 This kind of reasonableness 
inquiry has often informed not just the Terry cases but the Court’s other Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence that vindicates law enforcement interests.204 
B. The Pure Second Amendment Cases 
The focus on gun possession rights, and the presumption of the trusted gun-
possessor, also obscures the reality of unlawful gun possession in America. General 
legal protection for gun possession does not necessarily negate other specific gun 
controls that target persons based on their propensity to pose dangers when 
armed. “[P]laced in the wrong hands,” the Fourth Circuit (Judge Neimeyer, no less) 
has said, “firearms present a grave threat to public safety, and for this reason, the 
Anglo-American right to bear arms has always recognized and accommodated limi-
tations for persons perceived to be dangerous.”205 Consequently, under federal law 
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alone, for example, numerous restrictions exist on gun possession: felons,206 those 
who have been adjudicated as a mental defective or who have ever been commit-
ted to a mental institution,207 unlawful drug users or addicts,208 persons who have 
been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces,209 illegal aliens,210 and oth-
ers.211 It is a crime to knowingly receive a firearm with an obliterated or altered 
serial number.212 It is a crime to possess a machine gun.213 It is a crime for a minor 
to possess a firearm, except under limited conditions.214 Violent crimes, or drug 
trafficking crimes, committed with a firearm are subject to enhanced punish-
ments.215 And similar restrictions on possession and use of guns exist in state law.216 
Of course, entire bodies of criminal law and of psychiatric and criminological 
literature have developed around predictions of dangerousness.217 But this material 
is generally focused on dangerousness as a sentencing and corrections matter. 
Texas, for example, only permits imposition of capital punishment upon defendants 
whose future dangerousness has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.218 
Dangerousness has also become a central feature of non-capital sentencing and 
pre-trial detention.219 But officers in the field cannot be expected to consult the 
latest social science research when performing investigative stops. They must make 
informed, but ready, judgments on imperfect information, certainly less readily 
available than that available to a sentencing judge or a legislator. Terry, after all, 
feared “present” dangers, not hypothetical future ones.220 The aforementioned gun 
restrictions offer some guidance for making ex ante determinations of dangerous-
ness with respect to armed persons. But in light of Heller, a substantial body of case 
law has developed around these restrictions. That case law, too, seems to be trend-
ing toward considerations of dangerousness in weighing the validity of at least some 
restrictions under the Second Amendment. 
Heller itself speaks of danger. Heller refers to the core of the Second Amend-
ment as reserved for “law-abiding, responsible citizens” (as opposed to those who 
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are not law-abiding and responsible).221 This suggests that those who fall into the 
latter category are left unprotected because their possession of a firearm makes 
them a threat to civil society. Heller also speaks of “dangerous and unusual weap-
ons[,]” that are left unprotected by the Second Amendment.222 Finally, Heller 
speaks of “longstanding prohibitions” on “felons and the mentally ill.”223 This lan-
guage from Heller has been the subject of numerous challenges to gun possession 
restrictions.224 Although Heller did not establish a framework for evaluating the con-
stitutionality of such a gun restriction, lower courts have typically employed a 
framework that determines whether the restriction implicates the core of the Sec-
ond Amendment—the right of a law-abiding, responsible person to possess a gun 
in the home for defense—and then applies an appropriate means-ends review (typ-
ically, intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny), depending upon whether the as-
serted right fits historically within the Second Amendment’s core.225 
 Heller did not explicitly make dangerousness the standard against which to 
measure the constitutionality of a possession restriction. But some lower courts 
have appeared to use dangerousness as a guiding factor in determining whether 
the Second Amendment forbids application of the ban. 
In Binderup v. Attorney General, a (wildly) divided Third Circuit considered the 
federal felon-in-possession ban (section 922(g)(1)) as applied to two men with mis-
demeanor state convictions punishable by two or more years in state prison.226 The 
court held that their offenses were insufficiently serious and thus the Government 
had to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny.227 It could not, because the Government 
could not demonstrate that banning firearms for those who fit this category of chal-
lenger—someone with a decades-old misdemeanor conviction—would promote 
public safety or responsible gun ownership.228 The second step of the court’s as-
applied analysis therefore reflected at least an implicit judgment about the threat 
(or here, absence thereof) that these litigants would pose if armed.229 That threat 
was judged against such factors as the nature of the offense of conviction, the stale-
ness of the conviction, and law-abidingness since the conviction.230 
The Sixth Circuit conducted a similar kind of analysis with respect to section 
922(g)(4), which prevents firearm possession by someone who has been adjudi-
cated as a mental defective or committed to a mental institution.231 In Tyler v. Hills-
dale County Sheriff’s Department, the court considered the case of a man who, after 
a divorce, spent a month in a mental hospital.232 That incident occurred thirty years 
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ago.233 In the years since, he held a steady job, remarried, received counseling, had 
not again experienced a depressive episode, and was diagnosed as not being men-
tally ill.234 The court recognized that Congress had the power to “categorically pro-
hibit certain presumptively dangerous people from gun ownership[,]”235 and that 
courts should not impose “too high a burden on the government to justify its gun 
safety regulations, particularly where Congress has chosen to rely on prior judicial 
determinations that individuals pose a risk of danger to themselves or others.”236 
Concluding that not all persons captured by section 922(g)(4) are unprotected by 
the Second Amendment, applying strict scrutiny, and finding that the government 
possessed an important interest in enforcing section 922, the court nonetheless 
could not ascertain the appropriate fit. The court believed that the government had 
still not justified the 922(g)(4) ban either on its face or as applied to Tyler by showing 
that he “would be a risk to himself or others if he were allowed to possess a fire-
arm.”237 
In some cases, however, considerations of danger will lead a court to uphold 
a ban on possession. In United States v. Carter, for example, the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered the constitutionality of the federal restriction on possession by unlawful 
drug users (section 922(g)(3)), where the defendant possessed marijuana at the 
time he was found with a firearm in his apartment.238 In considering his challenge 
to the constitutionality of the statute, the court said that the government had an 
important interest in “keeping guns out of the hands of dangerous persons[.]”239 
Although the court remanded for consideration of the “fit” prong of its standard of 
review, with respect to whether “drug users and addicts possessing firearms are 
sufficiently dangerous to require disarming them[,]”240 the court noted that “[t]his 
burden should not be difficult to satisfy in this case” in light of the dangers of “mix-
ing drugs and guns.”241 As the Fourth Circuit also explained, the Seventh Circuit in 
United States v. Yancey had identified a close connection between drug use and 
violent crime.242 
Federal courts have been especially reliant upon the dangerousness rhetoric 
in the context of the domestic violence misdemeanant ban.243 Most recently, in 
Stimmel v. Sessions, the Sixth Circuit upheld section 922(g)(9), citing the Supreme 
Court’s recognition that the ban filled a “dangerous loophole” in the felon-in-pos-
session law,244 as well as its own recognition in Tyler that placing his conduct 
“squarely within” the core of the Second Amendment would undermine congres-
sional authority to “‘categorically prohibit certain presumptively dangerous people 
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from gun ownership.’”245 Even though Stimmel’s lone misdemeanor domestic vio-
lence conviction was stale (from 1997),246 the court was persuaded by the govern-
ment’s asserted proof that those convicted of domestic violence represent a future 
danger.247 Consequently, it held that there was a reasonable fit between section 
922(g)(9) and the government’s interest in keeping firearms from dangerous peo-
ple.248 Other circuits have followed this reasoning in upholding section 922(g)(9).249 
Even this admittedly cursory review of the Second Amendment cases demon-
strates why it is therefore important not to overstate Second Amendment rights or 
the accompanying case law. While a few recent cases have certainly helped give 
constitutional gun rights greater teeth, a significant body of federal case law has 
continued to uphold gun restrictions against Second Amendment challenges.250 
Still, as these recent cases show, the federal judiciary’s approach to as-applied gun 
possession restrictions has tended to emphasize dangerousness in weighing the 
government’s interests and those of the individual. The question is whether Second 
Amendment dangerousness can (or should) inform Terry-style dangerousness. 
C. Weighing Reasonableness and Terry’s Criminality Predicate 
As it turns out, then, state legislative judgments may be a poor proxy for dan-
gerousness. Although liberalization may reflect a general judgment that possessing 
a gun does not necessarily make one dangerous, those laws—no matter how lib-
eral—must account for other state laws, superseding federal laws, and Second 
Amendment jurisprudence that all provide for bases to restrict gun possession by 
some among the citizenry. At the same time, the Second Amendment cases reflect-
ing an emerging jurisprudence of dangerousness in evaluating as-applied challenges 
to gun possession restriction suggest that dangerousness is ordinarily judged 
against a variety of situational factors. And yet these pure Second Amendment 
cases tend to involve judgments made on the basis of facts that do not involve law 
enforcement judgments in the field and in the heat of a criminal investigation. The 
pure Second Amendment cases, then, may also be inadequate for assessing dan-
gerousness in the specific context of Terry stops. 
Still, what we know unequivocally from the Second Amendment cases is that 
the core of the right to keep and bear arms offers protection for law-abiding, re-
sponsible citizens.251 But remember: the initial Terry stop is impermissible unless 
the officer has reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed a crime or that 
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criminal activity is afoot.252 That criminality predicate undermines, or at least dimin-
ishes, any Second Amendment claim that the suspect may otherwise have. As far as 
the Fourth Amendment is concerned—its text, after all, requires only reasonable-
ness—the suspect is no longer to be regarded as innocent, law-abiding and respon-
sible. The construct of the virtuous citizen who poses no threat to the community 
has now collapsed—or at least been substantially diminished—in light of the of-
ficer’s reasonable suspicion for the seizure. Even if the officer turns out to be wrong, 
and the suspect has neither committed a crime nor engaged in any criminality and 
is possessing the gun lawfully, Terry gives the advantage to the officer until his initial 
suspicion is dispelled.253 And while it is true that one may engage in unlawful con-
duct and yet still pose no danger to an officer—even if armed—neither the Second 
Amendment nor Terry would appear to tip the balance in the suspect’s favor under 
the circumstances. As stated above, the underlying focus of Terry and its progeny is 
the protection of the officer.254 
State law gun rights pose a slightly different problem. But even in liberal gun 
rights jurisdictions, gun possession remains premised upon law-abidingness and re-
sponsible citizenship, with restrictions imposed either by state law or by supersed-
ing federal law.255 The criminality predicate for the Terry stop, therefore, counter-
balances the argument from state gun law as well. 
Gun rights law, then, can still receive meaningful protection under Terry doc-
trine, but most of its work is performed at the initial stage of the encounter. The 
liberalization of gun rights can function as a limit on the scope of the initial stop, as 
in cases like Northrup or Black. But once a legally sufficient justification has been 
established for the stop—reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed a 
crime or that criminal activity is afoot—the fact that the jurisdiction liberally permits 
gun possession and public carry has less force. The liberalization of gun law, 
whether via the Second Amendment, state legislation, or state constitutional law, 
relates to Terry’s criminality predicate because the law enforcement justification 
for the stop is drawn from an objective indicator—whether something is legal or 
illegal, which is (or ought to be) knowable to the investigating officer.256 Of course, 
the officer need only be reasonably suspicious of criminality, not certain. But still, 
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his judgment about whether to conduct the stop will be made based on his under-
standing of what the law objectively requires or permits. The decision whether to 
frisk—and the dangerousness determination that accompanies it—is different. It 
requires reasoned judgments based on factors that may arise during the stop or 
that are based on the officer’s experience, judgments that often must be made 
“even quicker” and “on less information” than is available with respect to the 
stop.257 
Permitting this broader scope for Terry frisks where there is reasonable suspi-
cion for the stop, as well as that the suspect is armed, has the virtue not only of 
being consistent with Second Amendment doctrine but also of providing law en-
forcement with adequate tools to enforce the gun restrictions at work in every ju-
risdiction. 
Of course, if one’s goal is to accommodate statutory and constitutional gun 
rights and yet still leave flexibility for law enforcement officers, and if allowing gun 
rights to function as a limit on the initial stop remains unsatisfying, then one way of 
synthesizing the state laws, the Terry cases, and the pure Second Amendment cases 
would be to judicially adopt a prophylactic rule that requires a reasonable inquiry 
before conducting the frisk. This was, after all, part of Terry’s original formulation,258 
and ostensibly would function consistently with the independent dangerousness 
approach from the Robinson dissent. Such a prophylactic might look like this: where 
an officer has conducted a valid Terry stop, but before he conducts a frisk based on 
his suspicion that a suspect is merely armed with a gun, the officer must specifically 
confirm whether the suspect is armed. If so, then the officer must determine 
whether the person has a legal right to his firearm possession at the time. And if so, 
there would be a presumption against conducting a frisk, unless additional facts 
develop that cast doubt on the suspect’s claim or otherwise independently create 
reasonable suspicion of dangerousness. 
There are reasons to be cautious about such a rule. Though it is consistent 
with some wording in Terry, it is inconsistent with much of Justice Harlan’s Terry 
concurrence,259 and with the Court’s holding in Williams (which appeared to adopt 
Justice Harlan’s position).260 A reasonable inquiry requirement would also poten-
tially increase the risk to officers, which Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Terry took 
pains to avoid.261 If a suspect is armed, but cannot be disarmed until the officer has 
conducted a reasonable inquiry into the legality of the suspect’s gun possession, 
this effectively puts the officer in a position of subservience to the unknown. That 
is a dangerous position in which to leave an officer who has already developed le-
gally sufficient cause to believe that the suspect is engaged in unlawful conduct.262 
Reasonable inquiry, then, may represent a sensible approach for officers in 
the field conducting Terry frisks if the goal is to give primacy to, and show adequate 
                                                                
 257. Saltzburg, supra note 22, at 967. 
 258. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).  
 259. See id. at 31–33 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 260. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). 
 261. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 27–30. 
 262. See United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 491 (10th Cir. 2013). See also Wilkins, supra note 
19, at 1187 (arguing that the combination of an armed suspect and unknown dangers puts law enforcement 
officers at great risk). 
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respect for, federal and state gun rights. Legislatures or individual police depart-
ments may consider adopting this approach.263 But making it a constitutional re-
quirement is a very different matter. 
Perhaps, then, the source of this dilemma is not really the conflict of two con-
stitutional provisions at all. Rather, perhaps it is with Terry’s standard. Terry 
acknowledges the difficult circumstances of everyday policing, as well as the split-
second judgments that officers must often make.264 And yet, the “armed and pres-
ently dangerous” formulation—particularly if read in conjunction with the inde-
pendent dangerousness approach—requires police officers to make judgments 
about dangerousness based often on very little objective information. If dedicated 
research in criminology has difficulty assessing dangerousness,265 imagine the diffi-
culty of making such an assessment quickly and based (often) only on suspicion 
about possible criminality—perhaps serious but perhaps only petty. Officers may 
have objective information about an armed suspect’s intentions, but usually that 
knowledge, too, will be imperfect. Requiring an ex ante determination of danger-
ousness based on limited information thus seems like an intolerable burden to place 
on law enforcement. 
And yet, that burden becomes more tolerable if we understand that neither 
Terry nor its progeny require a showing of actual dangerousness. Rather, they 
simply ask whether a reasonable officer would be justified in determining that a 
particular armed suspect poses a threat to the officer or others. In a legal and polit-
ical culture that respects the right to defend oneself or another with a firearm, it is 
easy to see why anything less than an independent dangerousness/inquiry rationale 
would be unsatisfying. But gun rights, like Fourth Amendment rights, are not with-
out limits. As the Court has (unanimously) said: 
 
Firearms are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes 
justify unusual precautions. Our decisions recognize the serious 
threat that armed criminals pose to public safety; Terry’s rule, 
which permits protective police searches on the basis of reasona-
ble suspicion rather than demanding that officers meet the higher 
standard of probable cause, responds to this very concern.266 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is the proud assertion of many gun rights advocates that guns should be 
widely permitted for the law-abiding, responsible citizen, while keeping guns out of 
the hands of dangerous people. Americans experience both sides of that formula. 
The Second Amendment is now understood to protect individual rights to keep and 
bear firearms—and, happily for Justice Thomas, there appears to be increasing ju-
dicial recognition of constitutional gun rights—and liberal gun laws exist throughout 
much of the country. And yet, legislation to regulate gun possession is also perva-
                                                                
 263. Compare legislation of this kind with legislation that requires individuals to show law en-
forcement that they are permitted to carry. See Maraachli, supra note 19, at 96–97. 
 264. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23–24. 
 265. See supra Section IV.B and accompanying notes. 
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2018 DANGER AT THE INTERSECTION OF SECOND AND FOURTH 407 
 
sive (and could sensibly be stronger nationwide). One can proclaim that the consti-
tutional law of criminal procedure should account for liberalization of gun posses-
sion, while still acknowledging the realities of the dangers that law enforcement 
officers face from armed suspects. Reading Terry to preclude stops based simply on 
the fact of gun possession while permitting frisks of suspects who are armed or rea-
sonably suspected as being armed, and who have otherwise been legitimately 
seized, responds to each of these concerns. Terry, then, can co-exist—even if some-
what uncomfortably—within a regime of liberalized gun rights, without compromis-
ing Terry’s core concern for the protection of law enforcement. 
